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In recent years, the increasing need for global coordination has attracted interest
in the governance of global-scale commons. In the current context, we observe
how online applications are ubiquitous, and how emerging technologies enable new
capabilities while reshaping sectors. Thus, it is pertinent to ask: could blockchain
technologies facilitate the extension and scaling up of cooperative practices and
commons management in this global context? In order to address this question, we
propose a focus on the most paradigmatic and widely successful examples of global
cooperation: global digital commons. Examples of these are the digital resources
maintained by large peer production communities, such as free/libre open source
software and Wikipedia. Thus, this article identifies and analyzes the potentialities of
blockchain to support the sustainability and management of global digital commons.
Our approach draws on Elinor Ostrom’s classic principles for commons governance,
although revisiting and adapting these to the more challenging scope of global digital
commons. Thus, in this work we identify the affordances which blockchain provides
(e.g., tokenization, formalization of rules, transparency or codification of trust) to support
the effective management of this type of global commons. As part of our analysis, we
provide numerous examples of existing blockchain projects using affordances in line
with each principle, as well as potential integrations of such affordances in existing
practices of peer production communities. Our analysis shows that, when considering
the challenges of managing global commons (e.g., heterogeneity or scale), the potential
of blockchain is particularly valuable to explore solutions that: distribute power, facilitate
coordination, scale up governance, visibilize traditionally invisible work, monitor and
track compliance with rules, define collective agreements, and enable cooperation
across communities. These affordances and the subsequent analysis contribute to the
emergent debate on blockchain-based forms of governance, first by providing analytical
categories for further research, but also by providing a guide for experimentation with
the development of blockchain tools to facilitate global cooperation.
Keywords: algorithmic governance, blockchain, distributed systems, global commons, digital commons, Ostrom,
peer production
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INTRODUCTION
This article explores the potentialities of blockchain linking it
to the literature on the management of global digital commons.
We draw firstly on Ostrom’s classic governance principles (1990),
which remind us how human communities have successfully self-
organized to manage their common resources (“commons1”).
Such principles provide guidance for the conditions a community
should respect in order to be sustainable, effective, and successful
in the long-term in its commons management. Ostrom’s
principles were, however, derived from studies of small-scale local
communities. In this article, we explore the role of emergent
blockchain technologies as an opportunity to improve and scale-
up communities’ governance within a global scale. Concretely, we
draw on the challenges of Ostrom’s principles when adapted to
global commons, identified by Stern (2011), in order to explore
how blockchain technologies could help to overcome some
of the limitations of Ostrom’s principles. Our analysis focuses
on global and digital commons, such as the digital commons
generated and maintained by Wikipedia or large Free/Libre Open
Source Software Software (FLOSS) communities, building on
Commons-Based Peer Production (CBPP) literature.
Commons Governance at a Global Scale
Ostrom (1990) studied commons-based communitarian
practices and identified eight design principles2 that contributed
to the sustainable management of commons. These principles
include diverse considerations such as the need to define
boundaries in the community, having participatory and inclusive
decision-making, or appropriate conflict resolution mechanisms.
These principles remain a source of inspiration for the new global
challenges. However, under the global scale of the resources
and the communities which manage them, these principles
require further re-consideration. Stern (2011) analyzed the
degree to which Ostrom’s design principles were transferable
to the management of global commons. The conclusion was
that, although they have considerable external validity, Ostrom’s
classic principles required adaptation when applied to global
commons (Stern, 2011, 229). This conclusion is in line with
the evaluation of the applicability of these principles to global
commons undertaken by Ostrom herself (Ostrom et al., 1999,
281–282). Ostrom identified a set of challenges for global
commons regarding governance, that include difficulties to scale
up participation and define collective choices, challenges due to
the cultural diversity, complications because of increasing rates of
interdependency and change, and the fact that global commons
depend on a single planet, from which there is no place to move.
Considering the challenges posed by global commons, in
this article, we explore the potentialities of blockchain-based
governance in a global context. Concretely, we look at the role
of blockchain in the context of CBPP communities managing
1The commons are resources held in common, with shared ownership, and
typically managed by a community under certain norms. It is distinct from both
State or Market resource management. Classic examples include common lands or
international waters, but also classical music (in public domain), a self-managed
social center, the Internet, or Wikipedia.
2Section “Affordances of Blockchain for the Governance of Global Digital
Commons” includes a definition of each of these principles.
global commons in the form of digital resources. The term CBPP,
originally coined by Benkler (2002), refers to an expanding model
of socio-economic production in which groups of individuals
cooperate with each other to produce shared resources without
a traditional hierarchical organization (Benkler, 2006). There are
multiple, well-known examples of this phenomenon, such as
Wikipedia, a project to collaboratively write a free encyclopedia;
OpenStreetMap, a project to create free/libre maps of the World
collaboratively; StackExchange, which are Q&A communities
which aim to provide accessible documentation; Thingiverse,
which provides open 3D-printable digital designs; or FLOSS
projects such as the operating system GNU/Linux, the web server
Apache, the content management system Drupal and the browser
Firefox. Given the popularity of Wikipedia and FLOSS, we will




Since its appearance with the proposal of Bitcoin, the first
distributed digital currency, blockchain technology has attracted
attention for its ability to support a global scale currency and
its potential to coordinate large communities without centralized
control or a centralized infrastructure. Blockchain is a distributed
and append-only database which, drawing on cryptography,
enables coordination over the Internet without requiring central
parties. Its origins are to be found in an article published
anonymously under a pseudonym (Nakamoto, 2008). Drawing
on a new data structure, the blockchain, problems such as double-
spending - how can you ensure that digital currency is not spent
twice? - could be solved in a decentralized manner. The result
was that third parties, such as bank central servers in this case,
could be avoided.
Considering these origins, blockchain technologies are,
unsurprisingly, commonly associated with cryptocurrencies, new
markets around emergent currencies, and overall with the
disruption of finance. Nevertheless, the potential of blockchain
goes beyond cryptocurrencies: it lies in its capacity to enable the
implementation of novel properties at an infrastructural level in
a fully decentralized manner. These properties have significant
potentials, for example, for the development of tools that mediate
and scale up governance processes.
To frame our analysis and in order to incorporate the
identified challenges for global commons in our analysis, Section
“Local Versus Global Commons” discusses the differences
between the types of commons studied by Ostrom and global
digital commons. Then, Section “Applications of Blockchain for
Commons Governance” introduces the debate on blockchain-
based forms of governance to situate the potential affordances of
blockchain technology in this context. Next, Section “Affordances
of Blockchain for the Governance of Global Digital Commons”
analyzes the role played by blockchain technologies, drawing
on the aforementioned affordances, for the governance of
global digital commons. The result is the identification of
a set of potentialities of blockchain technologies to tackle
challenges (Ostrom et al., 1999, 281–282) regarding the scaling
up of governance in managing global commons since, as
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the number of participants and heterogeneity of global CBPP
communities increase, it becomes more difficult for them
to organize and to reach agreements on rules and their
enforcement. Section “Discussion and Conclusion” will discuss
this result and provide some concluding remarks concerning the
potential of blockchain to contribute to large CBPP communities
in several ways.
LOCAL VERSUS GLOBAL COMMONS
For our analysis, we draw on Stern’s (2011) identification
of limitations of Ostrom’s principles, which has been widely
employed in the commons literature (e.g., Nayak and Berkes,
2012; Cox, 2014; Allen and Potts, 2016; Potts, 2019). In his
analysis of the limitations of Ostrom’s principles, Stern identifies
a set of distinctive characteristics of the commons studied
by Ostrom from which her principles were derived (Stern,
2011, 215). Developing from these characteristics, he identifies
(Stern, 2011, 216–218) a series of differences between local
and global commons that are relevant regarding governance.
Stern’s work, however, is focused on rival and global commons,
such as global fossil supplies. Thus, in order to analyze
the potentialities of blockchain for the governance of CBPP
communities managing global digital commons, we need firstly
to revisit these characteristics for the narrower scope of global
digital commons.
According to Stern (2011, 215), the main characteristics of
the commons studied by Ostrom, from which she derived her
principles, are:
1. The commons studied by Ostrom are bounded at local to
regional scale, in contrast to global commons. Thus, for
the cases we are going to analyze, Stern’s differences and
limitations are aligned with those from our analysis.
2. The number of participants in Ostrom’s case studies are in
the tens to a few thousands, while in the global commons
discussed by Stern, he assumes millions or even billions of
actors involved. For our analysis, we consider large cases
of CBPP communities, such as Wikipedia and large FLOSS
projects such as Apache, Firefox and Drupal, that have
from few millions to hundreds of thousands of participants
(Fuster-Morell et al., 2016). Thus, we consider large CBPP
communities, and incorporate Stern’s limitations partially.
3. The third of the differences concerns the degradation of
the commons, typical of rival commons. Digital commons,
such as FLOSS or digital encyclopedias, are non-rival
and, furthermore, sometimes anti-rival (Weber, 2004).
Therefore, we do not include the limitations associated
with this property in our analysis.
4. In the type of commons analyzed by Ostrom, the
participants share common interests with respect to
the management of the resource; while in the global
commons discussed by Stern, their collective interests
tend to diverge significantly. Tensions, regarding different
interests, appropriation and co-optation by internal and
external actors, are also a common problem in large
CBPP communities (e.g., De Filippi and Vieira, 2014;
Birkinbine, 2015; Sandoval, 2019). Therefore, we
incorporate Stern’s identified limitations regarding
this characteristic in our analysis.
5. The participants in the management of commons studied
by Ostrom share a common cultural and institutional
context; while in the global commons discussed by
Stern they come from “all cultures, all countries, all
political-economic systems, all political ideologies, and so
forth” (Stern, 2011, 217). While large CBPP communities
managing global digital commons develop a common
cultural context (Fuster-Morell, 2014), the challenges
regarding cultural diversity, also identified by Ostrom et al.
(1999, 281–282) for global commons, are similarly present
in large CBPP communities. Therefore, we incorporate this
characteristic and its derived limitations in our analysis.
6. Learning from experience is a possible strategy in the local
commons studied by Ostrom, while it is unfeasible for the
type of global commons analyzed by Stern. We discard
this limitation placed by Stern, since the literature shows
how large CBPP communities managing global digital
commons develop mechanisms and structures to facilitate
the learning and extension of communitarian practices
(e.g., Viégas et al., 2007; Forte et al., 2009; Fuster-Morell,
2010, 2014; Rozas, 2017).
Table 1, derived from a similar summary as in Stern (2011,
216), summarizes the characteristics identified by Stern, but
TABLE 1 | Differences between local commons (Ostrom, 1990), rival global
commons (Stern, 2011) and the type of global digital commons which we will
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extends and adapts them to the narrower scope of global digital
commons from which we will develop our analysis.
Having provided the ground to incorporate the limitations
identified by Stern (2011) for Ostrom’s principles to our context
of analysis, we next discuss the general affordances of blockchain
for commons governance.
APPLICATIONS OF BLOCKCHAIN FOR
COMMONS GOVERNANCE
The use of blockchain technologies to mediate governance has
been increasingly attracting the attention of social scientists
(Risius and Spohrer, 2017; Cagigas et al., 2021). The result
is a growing body of literature which revolves around
discussions on whether blockchain technologies could foster
the experimentation and rise of new forms of blockchain-based
governance3.
Within the debate about the potentialities of blockchain-based
governance we find, on the one hand, a myriad of perspectives
characterized by a high degree of techno-solutionism (Morozov,
2013). According to them, given the right code, in this case
in the form of smart contracts4 and DAOs5 (Decentralized
Autonomous Organization), blockchains allegedly can solve
Humanity’s problems by finding the right algorithms. In fact, this
is considered inevitable – following techno-determinism – since
“anything that can be decentralized will be” (Johnston, 2014).
These perspectives, however, tend to simplify or simply ignore the
complexity which lies behind social organization. For example,
they usually assume that hierarchies between the participants
might vanish thanks to the disintermediation enabled by the
use of decentralized technologies (e.g., Heuermann, 2015; Swan,
2015; Hayes, 2016). In other words, they tend to provide over-
reductionist accounts with regards to the distribution of power,
failing to acknowledge issues such as the generation of oligarchies
and the consequences of inherently embedding private market
logics (e.g., Freeman, 2013; Shaw and Hill, 2014; De Filippi
and Loveluck, 2016; De Filippi and Lavayssière, 2020). In
this respect, we agree with Schneider (2019) in understanding
decentralization not simply as a technical concept, but as a
performative act whose socio-political consequences need further
exploration, since the use of decentralized technologies does
not inherently imply the decentralization of other outcomes,
3This paper focuses on the governance of global commons through or with
blockchains, rather than the governance of blockchains, i.e., governance of the
communities which develop and maintain blockchain projects. This is a relevant
distinction since both debates are sometimes blurred. Conceptualizing a public
blockchain like Bitcoin as a global commons, and therefore its governance as a
commons-based process, is a promising approach to further our understanding of
the social aspects behind the development of these decentralized technologies, but
it is out of the scope of this paper.
4A Smart Contract (De Filippi et al., 2020) is a software program deployed in a
blockchain environment and executed in a distributed manner once the underlying
conditions are met.
5A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (Hassan and De Filippi, 2021) is
a blockchain-based system that enables people to coordinate and self-govern
themselves mediated by a set of self-executing rules deployed on a public
blockchain, and whose governance is decentralized (i.e., independent from central
control).
such as power. These types of issues, however, are not new.
Parallels can be traced, for example, to the discourses which
emerged during the popularization of access to the Internet in
the 1990s, embedding ideas to “create a world that all may
enter without privilege or prejudice accorded by race, economic
power, military force, or station of birth” (Barlow, 1996). On this
occasion, similar discourses are being generated, instead, around
blockchain technologies.
On the other hand, a critical stand against these techno-
solutionist perspectives, particularly the pioneering work of
Atzori (2015), has identified and criticized the limitations of
such approaches. This critical stand, however, tends to consider
traditional centralized authorities as inherently necessary to
enable democratic governance. As a result, as we have previously
argued (Rozas et al., 2021b), this critical stand has ignored the
potential of some collectives to self-organize. Again, the issue
is not new. Similar responses can be traced when reflecting on
unregulated markets from positions that, as a result, aim to
strengthen the role of traditional centralized authorities.
This lack of commons-oriented perspectives into the emergent
debate of blockchain-based governance led us to consider
incorporating the principles of commons governance present in
self-organized collectives into the development of blockchain-
based tools (Rozas et al., 2021b). Our aim was to contribute
to building perspectives which neither rely on the logics
of private markets, as implicitly assumed by these former
perspectives, nor on the coercion of traditional centralized
institutions, as in the case of the latter accounts. The result
was the identification of six affordances6 (Hutchby, 2001),
which constitute functional and relational aspects that frame
the potentialities of self-organized collectives for agentic action,
with regards to blockchain-based tools for commons governance
(Rozas et al., 2021b, 8–20):
I. Tokenization: refers to the process of transforming the
rights to perform an action on an asset into a transferable
data element, a token, on the blockchain.
II. Self-enforcement and formalization of rules: refer to
the process of embedding organizational rules in the
form of smart contracts. As a result, firstly, there is an
affordance for the self-enforcement of communitarian
rules, such as those which regulate the monitoring and
graduated sanctions in these communities. Secondly, this
encoding of rules implies explicitation, since blockchain
technologies require these rules to be defined in ways that
are unambiguously understood by machines.
III. Autonomous automatization: refers to the process of
defining complex sets of smart contracts as DAOs,
which may enable multiple parties to interact with each
other, even without human interaction. This is partially
analogous to software communicating with other software
6The reasoning to frame our analysis through “affordances” relates to the need to
navigate the Scylla and Charybdis of technological determinism and technological
constructivism present in the field of science and technology studies (Juris, 2012).
See Wellman et al. (2003), Boyd (2010), and Juris (2012) for examples in the use
of affordances in the context of analysis in the Internet, social media and social
movements, respectively.
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today, but in a decentralized manner, and with higher
degrees of software autonomy.
IV. Decentralization of power over the infrastructure:
refers to the process of communalizing the ownership
and control of the technological tools employed by
the community through the decentralization of the
infrastructure they rely on, such as the collaboration
platforms (and their servers) employed for coordination.
V. Increasing transparency: refers to the process of opening
the organizational processes and the associated data by
relying on the persistence and immutability properties of
blockchain technologies.
VI. Codification of trust: refers to the process of codifying
a certain degree of trust into systems which facilitate
agreements between agents without requiring a third
party, such as the federal agreements which might be
established among different groups that form part of such
communities.
These affordances drew on Ostrom’s classic principles (1990),
that were derived from her studies on communities managing
local commons. In the next section, we discuss them in the
context of large CBPP communities managing global digital
commons, such as Wikipedia and large FLOSS communities,
incorporating the challenges identified by Stern (2011) for each
of Ostrom’s design principles.
AFFORDANCES OF BLOCKCHAIN FOR
THE GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL DIGITAL
COMMONS
This section will analyze the role played by blockchain
technologies, drawing on the aforementioned affordances, for
the governance of global digital commons. Thus, it is divided
into eight subsections, one for each of Ostrom’s governance
principles. For each principle, we analyze how the blockchain
affordances may contribute to the management of global digital
commons, considering the challenges for global commons by
Stern (2011). In addition, and again for each principle, we
provide examples, first on how the affordance may be used
in large CBPP communities (using Wikipedia and FLOSS as
recurring examples), and second on how such affordance already
operates in other contexts. The reason to use examples of these
affordances “in action” out of the CBPP context is the lack of
mature implementations of blockchain. Table 2 summarizes how
the principles, the blockchain affordances and Stern’s challenges
relate to each other.
Thus, next we bring together the aforementioned affordances
of blockchain for each of Ostrom’s principles, contextualized
within global digital commons.
Clearly Defined Community Boundaries
This principle refers to the need to have clear boundaries
regarding who has rights and privileges over the community’s
commons, which becomes more challenging for global
TABLE 2 | Summary of the relationships between the affordances of blockchain
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The table is inspired by a similar summary by Stern (2011, 220), but adapted to
this narrower scope. For example, we have added a challenge concerning the
definition of boundaries, which Stern (2011, 220) considers inapplicable, and we
remove the additional principles (e.g., invest in science) as well as the challenges
regarding principles (1990) which do not fit within this scope (e.g., because digital
commons are non-rival/anti-rival).
communities because of its size7. In the case of large CBPP
communities, such as Wikipedia and large FLOSS cases,
boundaries are usually defined to coordinate contribution
activities. Such boundaries are reflected, for instance, in
7Stern (2011, 221) argues that “defining boundaries for resources and
appropriators is not a meaningful exercise for global commons, even though
it is possible to treat political jurisdictions as boundaries for the enforcement
agreements made by sovereign authorities.” However, for the case of global digital
commons discussed in this article, we incorporate Ostrom’s first principle in our
analysis since these boundaries have been found relevant in large cases of CBPP
(e.g., Forte et al., 2009; Jemielniak, 2016; Dulong de Rosnay and Stalder, 2020;
Rozas and Huckle, 2021).
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the platforms employed to coordinate collaboration. The
software usually defines permissions and rights to modify
the commons managed (e.g., who can edit a protected article
in Wikipedia) as well as the rules for participants to gain
or lose permissions and transit between roles (e.g., who
can accept changes in a FLOSS project). For example, in
the case of Wikipedia, this demarcation was found when
exploring the relationship between technical and social
power (Forte et al., 2009; Jemielniak, 2014). Similarly, for
large FLOSS communities, boundaries operate to participate
in the production and management of FLOSS subprojects
(Rozas and Huckle, 2021).
In this context, the capacity of blockchain for tokenization
(I) provides new capabilities to experiment with the use
of different types of tokens in collaboration platforms. In
particular, the distribution of tokens allows for participation
rights to be more easily and granularly defined, propagated
and revoked. Blockchain tokens can represent both the
participation in an organization and the voting rights and
power of each actor. For example, tokens can be employed
to define the rights of and support decision-making around
collectively managed assets, such as a co-working space
or the resources employed by a cooperative of taxi drivers
(Voshmgir, 2019, 376; Eva Coop, 2021). The use of tokens
to represent rights and power in blockchain systems is
central in some blockchain frameworks such as Aragon,
DAOStack or Colony (Karjalainen, 2020). Within them,
programs can authorize or deny certain actions to users
depending on the tokens they own or expend. Thus, these
tokens may be used by communities managing global
digital commons, such as Wikipedia, to represent the
different users’ roles and permissions, as well as the rules to
obtain access to them.
Congruence Between Rules and Local
Conditions
This principle defines that the rules that govern behavior or
resource use in a community should be: flexible and based
on local conditions that may change over time, and intimately
associated with the characteristics of the resources, rather than
relying on a “one-size-fits-all” regulation. As noted by Stern
(2011), the challenge for global commons resides in identifying
the relevant conditions in such a heterogeneous environment.
In a blockchain context, the required explicitation of rules
(II) which is encompassed in the development of smart
contracts has an impact on visibilizing otherwise invisible
tasks, such as reproductive labor (Jarrett, 2014; Fuchs, 2018).
Thus, it provides opportunities to make these rules more
available and visible for discussion, and therefore increase
the degree of reflection which may lead to a higher degree
of adaptability. In fact, new projects focus on increasing
the customization and adaptability of blockchain applications.
For instance, SourceCred8 enables online communities to
decide which contributions to recognize, and how are they
8See https://sourcecred.io, for an example of a reputation protocol for open
collaboration.
valued. It provides a framework to automatically acknowledge
contributions including online participation, e.g., from software
repositories (Github), community chats (Discord), and forums
(Discourse). Furthermore, it has developed explicit mechanisms
for users to request acknowledgment for activities that are not
yet automatically recognized. Thus, such software promotes an
active discussion of the notion of value in the community, beyond
that directly related to the digital commons themselves (Rozas
et al., 2021a). Furthermore, it enables voices from different types
of contributors to be heard and valued.
Also, it is worth noting that the first implementations
of blockchain systems did not provide ample smart contract
flexibility given the blockchain immutability, which could
have affected the implementation of this principle. However,
current implementations provide tools to overcome former
limits and upgrade smart contracts as needed. Examples are the
upgradeability9 of Aragon’s DAO platform and Open Zeppelin’s
tools for smart contract updating10.
Collective Choice Arrangements
This principle defines that in order to best achieve the congruence
called for in the previous principle, the members who are affected
by these rules should be able to participate in their modification,
and the costs of such modifications should be kept low. In line
with Stern’s (2011) review for global commons, allowing most
users to participate in developing the rules is a huge challenge
leading to the need to unpack this principle: which groups of
participants should be involved in creating and modifying which
rules? How might blockchain influence the relationship between
social (e.g., users) and technical power (e.g., platform developers
and owners)?
This principle connects to two of the affordances. Firstly,
as in the case of the previous principle, the aforementioned
capacity for tokenization (I) of blockchain technologies could
be employed to readdress latent power relations in these
communities. The result could help to increase the participation
of members who have traditionally had less power, and to give
greater visibility to the differences of power within a community.
Secondly, it relates to the affordance provided by blockchain to
decentralize the power over the infrastructure (IV).
The control over the infrastructure (e.g., servers) which
sustains, for example, the main collaboration platforms (e.g.,
Wikipedia’s), commonly emerges as a point of organizational
tension, that entails constant negotiation to generate collective-
choice agreements (e.g., who can access and control Wikipedia’s
servers). When CBPP communities start to grow substantially,
they normally try to decentralize control over this infrastructure,
which is commonly achieved by incrementing the degree of
formalization. For example, defining more explicit and rigid
organizational processes, roles and even formal institutions, such
as the Wikimedia Foundation (Forte et al., 2009; Jemielniak,
2014) and FLOSS associations (Rozas and Huckle, 2021)
returning to our previous examples.
9See https://hack.aragon.org/docs/upgradeability-intro
10See https://docs.openzeppelin.com/learn/upgrading-smart-contracts
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In large FLOSS communities the “threat of forking11,” for
example, conditions the members or institutions holding more
power, to be perceived as accountable and legitimate in the eyes
of the community, and they commonly respond by limiting and
distributing their power over time. Similar dynamics have been
found in other large CBPP communities beyond FLOSS, such as
Wikipedia (Tkacz, 2014; Jemielniak, 2016).
While, in technical terms, forking code has become a simple
operation, forking the infrastructure remains a complex matter
which is significantly costly in terms of effort. Indeed, when forks
in FLOSS communities occur, those who decide to fork the code
usually need to create a new infrastructure from scratch. The use
of blockchain technologies offers, in this respect, a promising field
of experimentation and exploration of potential changes in these
dynamics. The inherent properties of blockchain technologies
facilitate the forking of the whole infrastructure and even the
communitarian rules which have been encoded in them. Thus,
the decentralization of the infrastructure reduces the technical
cost to fork the community, reducing the power within the
community of those previously in control of the infrastructure.
In other words, the “threat of forking” conditions the processes of
negotiation since participants holding more power are expected
to maintain a general direction of the project which acknowledges
and includes the main desires of the community.
These examples allow us to imagine scenarios of the
possible opportunities gained by decentralizing power over the
infrastructure in CBPP. Blockchain technologies may shape these
dynamics by offering a higher degree of pressure for negotiation
on those holding more power in the community, and eventually
it may foster permissionless innovation (Thierer, 2016). In fact,
many current blockchain projects are indeed forks of original
blockchains implementing different rules. Unlike in other FLOSS
software, these forks do not only duplicate the code of the
programs, but can also duplicate the existing community, data,
and value (e.g., if you own a bitcoin before a fork happens, you
will also own a ‘forked-bitcoin’ in the forked blockchain, retaining
both the original bitcoin and the new one). The Hive fork of
the original Steem blockchain is a recent relevant example of
these community forks (Jeong, 2020). Steem is the blockchain
supporting the Steemit social network, one of the most used
blockchain applications (Jeong, 2020). In February 2020, the
Tron Foundation acquired the company developing Steemit,
and a large proportion of the blockchain tokens. This raised
concerns about the centralization of power in the network, as
the new owners could exclusively control the network using
their tokens. The Hive is a community fork of the original
Steem that aims to avoid such a concentration of power, and has
successfully attracted most of the original platform users. Thus,
blockchain technology seems to facilitate community efforts to
fork a software and its community, increasing the decision-
making power of online communities while decreasing the power
of the infrastructure’s owners.
11Forking, in FLOSS communities, occurs when participants take a copy of source
code from one project and start a new, independent and distinct version of it.
This may or may not cause the fragmentation of the community in two different
projects. Thus, the “threat of forking” reflects the fear of such fragmentation to
occur.
Monitoring
This principle concerns some participants in the community
acting as monitors of behavior in accordance with the
rules derived from collective choice arrangements. These
participants should be accountable to the rest of the
community. Stern (2011) argues that this principle remains
essential for global commons, although it becomes more
difficult to implement.
Several of the affordances of blockchain for commons
governance remain potentially useful in the context of global
digital commons. On the one hand, the affordances for
self-enforcement (II) of smart contracts and, more widely,
that of autonomous automatization (III) – without human
mediation – provide further means to track and communally
fiscalize new aspects of the organizational processes. Secondly,
the blockchain affordance of increasing transparency (V)
may enable higher accountability, and might lead to more
peer-to-peer forms of monitoring. Peer-to-peer monitoring
is usual in CBPP communities, as part of their strong culture
of openness. This culture of openness also involves the
opening of the data generated in the collaboration processes.
This constitutes a useful means for CBPP communities
to successfully carry out and scale up their processes
of monitoring.
Thus, blockchain might facilitate the monitoring of
community rules. On the one hand, smart contracts represent
rules of the online communities, which may include automatic
mechanisms for specific monitoring. On the other hand, all
interactions are recorded in the blockchain and can be observed
in real time by any party. This has already enabled users to detect
and mitigate the effects of users behaving against the perceived
community rules. For instance, in 2017 a hacker stole $32 million
worth of cryptocurrencies in Ethereum, exploiting a software
vulnerability. As a first response, a group of users called “The
White Hat Group” stole all the other accounts affected by the
same vulnerability ($208 million), in order to avoid it being
stolen by other hackers taking advantage of it. Afterward, they
returned that money to their owners, once the vulnerability was
fixed (Zetzsche et al., 2018).
The use of blockchain to support transparent and open peer-
reviewing (Ford, 2013) is another example of the applications
of blockchain for community monitoring. This is seen in the
blockchain-based system implemented by Tenorio-Fornés et al.
(2019), intended to increase the quality and accountability
of peer-reviewing practices in academia. The system relies
upon three pillars supported by decentralized technologies
(Tenorio-Fornés et al., 2019, 4637–4368). Firstly, an “open
access by-design” approach to store publications. Secondly, more
transparent decision-making regarding peer-reviewing practices.
The system proposes the storage of metadata of the publication
process, such as who the reviewers are and the changes between
the different revisions, into a decentralized ledger. In this way,
such interactions are time-stamped, tamper-proof and subject
to communitarian monitoring. Thirdly, the system proposes an
open reputation network of reviewers supported by blockchain,
which would reward positive behavior and reduce and expose
unfair or biased reviews.
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Therefore, large online communities can also use blockchain
to automate certain rules and enable the monitoring of
communitarian behavior transparently. In fact, existing large
communities such as Wikipedia already make extensive use of
transparent records to monitor user interactions, and automate
a large part of the monitoring using bots, programmed with
specific responsive automatic actions. Thus, blockchain may be
useful to enhance this transparency, improve CBPP community
monitoring, and its automation.
Graduated Sanctions
This principle states that participants not only actively monitor
but also sanction one another when behavior is found to conflict
with community rules. These sanctions against participants who
violate the rules should be aligned with the perceived severity of
the infraction. As with the case of monitoring, Stern (2011) argues
that this principle is also essential for global commons, although
it is more difficult to implement because the participants are more
loosely connected. For example, the parties in conflict are likely to
live in different countries with largely different cultural settings.
How to define and execute sanctions in such contexts becomes a
significant challenge.
The affordances of self-enforcement (II) and autonomous
automatization (III) for blockchain-based governance for large
CBPP communities managing digital commons offer, in this
respect, several avenues of exploration. Smart contracts can be
employed by these communities to automatically self-enforce
the rules that regulate the graduated sanctions agreed in the
community. Furthermore, this capacity for self-enforcement
could be even more intense when considering DAOs. DAOs
can take the initiative when certain events happen, and react
autonomously upon circumstances or user actions. In other
words, they increase the degree of impersonalization with regards
to the application of the sanctions agreed by the community. The
effects are unknown and could vary: from preventing the usual
effect of reacting against the enforcer or “killing the messenger,”
to the triggering of frustration and impotence as has been the case
with previous reactions against machines (Postman, 1993).
In this respect, we can find existing examples in which
blockchain software implements community sanctions. For
instance, Kleros is a blockchain project providing blockchain-
supported courts. In these courts, a jury formed by community
members would mediate community conflict resolutions,
delivering blockchain-supported verdicts. Furthermore, projects
implementing these blockchain courts such as Aragon Court,
have specific rules to sanction misbehaving members of the jury,
since the community can start a vote to remove their power
in the jury. Thus, large online communities can both encode
sanctions in their smart contracts (e.g., losing a privilege if the
community agrees so) and use blockchain courts to sanction
behaviors against the community rules.
Conflict Resolution Mechanisms
This principle specifies that members of the community should
have easy access to spaces in which to resolve conflicts. As in
the case of the principle regarding the graduated sanctions, the
difficulties identified by Stern (2011) for global commons are
derived from the challenges posed by these communities being
more loosely connected than those studied by Ostrom.
In this respect, the affordances of increasing transparency (V)
and autonomous automatization (III) might be valuable for the
design of blockchain-based tools which facilitate the scaling up
of conflict resolution mechanisms in these large communities.
On the one hand, transparency is commonly employed by
large CBPP communities as part of their conflict resolution
mechanisms. One can think, for example, of the enormous
amount of content which can be found in the discussion pages
of Wikipedia; or in the issue lists of FLOSS communities.
These large amounts of data are not usually solely related to
the digital commons maintained, but also to the organizational
processes which surround them. Such transparency facilitates
access, participation and visibility of conflict resolution processes.
On the other hand, the employment of the aforementioned
DAOs could lead to spaces in which conflicts are made explicit,
between members of a DAO, across DAOs, and between DAOs
and humans. This encourages communities to establish more
explicit mechanisms for conflict resolution, which may be at
least partially tackled by automated processes. In fact, Aragon
is already working on creating digital jurisdictions for conflict
resolution within, and across, DAOs.
As previously introduced in the graduated sanctions section,
some blockchain projects are developing blockchain-supported
courts and other arbitration mechanisms (Metzger, 2019). In the
case of Aragon Court, there is a hierarchy of courts for conflict
resolution. Primary courts are “low cost” (since they imply a small
cost in cryptocurrency), although the system enables appeals
to higher and more expensive courts if a party is not satisfied
with the verdict. However, despite these developments, these
courts are far from replacing standard courts of laws, nor do
they tackle major conflicts. In fact, we often see the resolution
of conflicts in blockchain projects themselves being discussed
and resolved in more traditional online platforms, such as social
networks, forums and blogs. At times, these conflicts have also
been escalated to traditional state courts. For instance, in the
ecosystem of Aragon, a conflict over funding allocation and
contractual obligations between the Aragon Association and the
company Autark ended up in the Swiss court12.
The blockchain-supported courts and similar conflict
resolution mechanisms could lower the cost to solve conflicts
within global communities, and provide transparency to the
conflict resolution processes. Moreover, the sole discussion
and definition of a legitimate conflict resolution mechanism
in an online community can reduce the effects of the so called
“Tyranny of Structurelessness” (Freeman, 2013), in which
power dynamics are strengthened when no formal structure
is provided. Thus, blockchain can offer additional conflict
resolution mechanisms to the tools already in use by global
communities managing digital commons.
Local Enforcement of Local Rules
This principle states that the local jurisdiction to create and
enforce rules should be recognized by higher authorities. In the
12See https://defirate.com/aragon-autark/
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case of the commons studied by Ostrom, these higher authorities
are commonly referred to as those of traditional institutions, such
as states, regional or local governments. An example could be
government officials who acknowledge the creation of local rules
in the context of self-organized fishing communities. Parallelisms
have been established in the case of digital commons, but
referring to higher authorities as the most formal and centralized
institutions which commonly emerge in these communities, such
as the Wikimedia Foundation (Forte et al., 2009), or FLOSS
associations (Rozas and Huckle, 2021), to continue with the
previous cases. In the emergence of Wikipedia’s autonomous
WikiProjects, jurisdiction to devise their own local rules is
acknowledged by the more central authorities of Wikipedia. Also,
the local jurisdiction of sub-projects is acknowledged within
the general project in FLOSS communities (Rozas and Huckle,
2021). This is in line with Stern’s (2011) challenges within this
global scope, regarding the need to affirmatively facilitate local
governance and peer-to-peer learning.
This principle, hence, connects with several affordances of
blockchain. First of all, with the capacity of blockchain to
self-enforce rules (II) and its relationship to formalize and
codify agreements to facilitate the scaling up of trust (VI).
Continuing with our examples of Wikipedia and large FLOSS
communities, such smart contracts could embed the agreements
within the aforementioned WikiProject or FLOSS sub-projects,
in ways which encode that the local aspects are only decided
by participants belonging to such projects. In other words, if
we think of these communities as networks, blockchain-based
tools for commons governance might help local nodes of CBPP
communities to more easily ensure, by code, that their local
jurisdiction13 and enforcement of local rules are acknowledged by
higher authorities as well as by other nodes.
Additionally, this principle relates to the decentralization
of power over infrastructure (IV). In Section “Collective
Choice Arrangements,” several examples of this affordance were
discussed regarding the increasing capacity for forkability and
its relationship to social aspects. Similarly, in this scenario it
can facilitate a higher degree of autonomy to the local spaces
which emerge over time. In other words, the differences in forms
of pressure may provide new conditions for the negotiations
that relate to having their local contexts and jurisdictions
acknowledged by higher authorities.
The use of blockchain in virtual reality projects such as
Decentraland (Chaudhari et al., 2019) offers an intuitive example
of how blockchain can be applied to facilitate local enforcement
of local rules. In Decentraland, users can purchase virtual land.
They can also modify virtual land, incorporate 3D elements
into it and change the colors and textures of this virtual world.
The owners are the only users allowed to modify the land, and
to sell it to other users. These users can also participate in
the decisions that affect the whole functioning of Decentraland,
such as the rules regulating land auctions. Thus, blockchain can
facilitate the autonomy of users and groups beyond this virtual
reality example. For example, groups of users in large FLOSS
13In this context, we refer to jurisdiction as the area over which the members of the
node have control (Sullivan, 2009).
projects can receive crypto-currencies to develop a sub-project.
Furthermore, blockchain can facilitate the autonomous handling
of the funds by these groups. Examples of the autonomous
management of funding are numerous in the blockchain space,
for example in Gitcoin (Qayum and Razzaq, 2020), Aragon
(Aragon Flocks14) and Ethereum (Moloch DAO15).
Multiple Layers of Nested Enterprises
The last of Ostrom’s principles states that, by forming multiple
nested layers of organization, communities can address issues
that affect resource management differently at broader and
very local levels in order to scale up their governance. This
is in line with Stern’s (2011) challenges within the global
scope concerning the need to find effective combinations of
institutional types which facilitate local governance and allow
it to scale up. In the commons literature, such institutional
types commonly rely on the notion of polycentrism, which
refers to the co-existence of several centers of governance which
blend the distribution of authority and power with effective
coordination between these centers (Ostrom et al., 1961). The
concept polycentric governance was originally coined for the
study of the organization of government in metropolitan areas,
and subsequently employed for the study of management of
natural resources. However, this concept has been more recently
employed to explain self-governance in communities managing
the peer production of digital commons (Mindel et al., 2018),
such as Wikipedia (Hartswood et al., 2014; Safner, 2016) and large
FLOSS communities (Rozas, 2017, 313–316).
In this respect, the affordance of blockchain for the
codification of trust (VI), implemented through interoperability,
offers avenues for future exploration. In technical terms,
interoperability refers to the property of a system to operate
with other systems through a series of interfaces. Such interfaces
codify the rules of interaction of different units, and thus codify
part of the trust, facilitating interaction. Blockchain provides
affordances to increase the degree of collaboration not only
through the generation of interfaces, but also by providing a full
communal infrastructure: a shared decentralized database. This
process of codification of trust may simply refer to the individuals
and their interactions, as in the case of the transactions of
cryptocurrencies. However, it may also involve the agreements
arranged between the different groups that form part of the
community, fostering the capacity of these communities to
scale up governance in polycentric ways. Thus, and returning
again to our previous examples of Wikipedia and large FLOSS
projects, one can envision tools designed to facilitate polycentric
governance in CBPP communities in the form of different locally
shaped platforms encoding agreements according to the local
conditions of each group, such as WikiGroups and FLOSS
sub-projects within the general project. These platforms could
be autonomously governed by the participants who belong
to each of the groups, but interoperate between them and
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Cryptokitties (Min et al., 2019), a blockchain based collectable
game where you can breed and trade virtual cats, offers
an example of blockchain interoperability capabilities.
First, as it uses a blockchain interoperable standard for
non-fungible tokens such as collectables. Thus, these
collectables can be traded and used in multiple applications
that support this standard, that is they can be exchanged
for others. Furthermore, given its popularity, several games
have been developed in which you can play using your
own cryptokitties. These games are grouped in the so-
called KittyVerse (Min et al., 2019). Thus, global online
communities managing digital commons may implement such
interoperability among their communities using blockchain
applications. This would enable the creation of federations
of online communities, and enhance the exchanges and
interactions among them.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this article, we have explored the potentialities of blockchain
to facilitate and scale up the governance of large and global CBPP
communities managing digital commons. As we have shown,
there are numerous examples of blockchain communities that
make use of practices that may be beneficial if adopted by these
CBPP communities. These practices reinforce Nobel laureate
Elinor Ostrom’s principles (1990) for sustainable community
governance, taking into account the adaptation of such principles
for global commons (Ostrom et al., 1999; Stern, 2011). To
sum up, we can observe that blockchain has the potential
to contribute to large CBPP communities in multiple ways,
helping to: distribute power, facilitate coordination, scale up
governance, visibilize traditionally invisible work, monitor and
track compliance with rules, define collective agreements, and
enable cooperation across communities.
This article and the theoretical framework it relies on (Rozas
et al., 2021b) contribute to linking commons literature with
blockchain technologies. Previous literature includes: Cila
et al. (2020), who draw on the aforementioned blockchain
affordances to develop a framework with three mechanisms
and six design dilemmas for blockchain-based platforms
to support local forms of CBPP; Calcaterra (2018), who
discusses how Ostrom’s principles could be applied to
DAOs; and Shackelford and Myers (2017), who review the
applicability of Ostrom’s principles focusing on the governance
of blockchains (instead of with blockchains). Other authors,
without including blockchain within their analyses, have
explored how Ostrom’s principles could be mathematized
(Pitt et al., 2012, 2017) and applied to algorithmic governance
(Clippinger and Bollier, 2014).
This work contributes to the emergent literature on
blockchain-based forms of governance in several ways. First, it
analyzes the challenges encompassed by the different nature of
global digital commons, when compared to those from which
Ostrom’s principles were derived, while linking them with the
role of blockchain. This analysis has allowed us to reflect on the
role that blockchain-based technologies already play in existing
blockchain projects, and their potential role in current large
CBPP communities. Overall, blockchain technologies could
facilitate coordination, help to scale up commons governance
and even be useful to enable cooperation among various
communities in interoperable ways. In addition, our analysis
reveals that, when considering the challenges of managing global
commons (Ostrom et al., 1999, 281–282), the role of blockchain
is particularly valuable to explore solutions that tackle the
scaling up of governance and the definition of global collective
agreements within more heterogeneous conditions (Stern, 2011).
A better understanding of the capabilities of blockchain
technologies to support global forms of commons governance
will require, however, further empirical research. In fact, we
strongly recommend those willing to develop blockchain tools
to support CBPP to do so guided by research. Moreover,
the development of such tools should be carried out hand-
in-hand with the CBPP community participants, in order to
avoid the multiple problems of top-down software building
and algorithmic biases (O’Neil, 2016; Eubanks, 2018). This
should enable the development of blockchain-based technology
which incorporates particular social practices into the design. In
other words, the development should be aware of the cultural
context of each CBPP community, as well as aiming to place
the people who have been traditionally marginalized by design
in the center (Costanza-Chock, 2020). The aforementioned
relationships between the blockchain affordances and the
challenges for global commons summarized in Table 2, could
be employed as analytical categories from which to start the co-
designing of this type of tools (e.g., Cila et al., 2020; Rozas, 2020).
Blockchain technologies are still young, and it is still early
to envision the applications and practices that will take hold
within communities. Further experimentation will enable their
study and monitoring to extract best practices and successful
patterns that may be incorporated more easily and with lower
risks into existing CBPP communities. In fact, the analysis of the
current practices of existing blockchain communities (El Faqir
et al., 2020) is an open research line which may provide fruitful
results to draw from.
This article has focused on the potentialities of blockchain
for the governance of global digital commons. The challenges
concerning other types of global commons, such as oceans
and the atmosphere, would require a different analysis which
incorporates specific characteristics and challenges. Future work
may also explore more systematically the limitations, drawbacks
and risks posed by the use of blockchain in this overall global
context. The use of the blockchain affordances as categories
for analysis could be useful in order to identify such risks.
For example, with regards to tokenization, it would be relevant
to explore the risks posed by extreme quantification and data
fetishism (Sharon and Zandbergen, 2017); with regards to
increasing transparency, those risks related to the need to comply
with the “right to be forgotten” (Stevenson, 2010); or with
regards to formalization and self-enforcement of rules, the risks
related to the tools leading to extreme strictness and intrusiveness
(De Filippi and Hassan, 2016).
Commons-Based Peer Production communities render
radically different values and practices when compared with
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those that operate within the hegemonic logic of markets.
As we have aimed to show, blockchain may facilitate the
experimentation of ways in which to scale-up such forms of
cooperation. We hope this combination may open up new
avenues for the extension of commoning practices, and the much-
needed cooperation in our world at these unsettled times.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The original contributions presented in the study are included
in the article/supplementary material, further inquiries can be
directed to the corresponding author.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
DR coordinated the elaboration of the manuscript and
participated in all the phases, including conceptualization,
literature review, structuration, analysis, and overall writing
of the article. AT-F participated in the conceptualization,
structuration, analysis, and writing of the manuscript. In
addition, he provided most of the blockchain examples used in
Section “Affordances of Blockchain for the Governance of Global
Digital Commons.” SH supervises the project this manuscript is
part of, P2P Models, of which he is the Principal Investigator.
In addition, he discussed the manuscript’s general approach,
reviewed the manuscript, contributed to parts of it across
all sections and to the discussions and examples. All authors
contributed to the article and approved the submitted version.
FUNDING
This work was partially supported by the project P2P Models
(https://p2pmodels.eu) funded by the European Research
Council ERC-2017-STG (grant no.: 759207) and by the project
Chain Community funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science,
Innovation and Universities (grant no.: RTI2018-096820-A-100).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We are grateful to the editor and the reviewers for their
constructive feedback on our manuscript. We would like to
thank Vasilis Kostakis and Eve Guterman for their valuable
comments, as well as Tabitha Whittall for her help in copyediting
and proofreading this article. Finally, we would like to thank
Alexandra Elbakyan (Sci-Hub) for her contribution to make
scientific knowledge available for everyone.
REFERENCES
Allen, D., and Potts, J. (2016). How innovation commons contribute to discovering
and developing new technologies. Int. J. Commons 10, 1035–1054. doi: 10.
18352/ijc.644
Atzori, M. (2015). Blockchain technology and decentralized governance: is the state
still necessary? J. Gov. Regul. 6, 45–62. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2709713
Barlow, J. (1996). A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace. San Francisco,
CA: Electronic Frontier Foundation.
Benkler, Y. (2002). Coase’s penguin, or, Linux and “The nature of the firm.” Yale
Law J. 112, 369–446. doi: 10.2307/1562247
Benkler, Y. (2006). The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms
Markets and Freedom. London: Yale University Press.
Birkinbine, B. J. (2015). Conflict in the commons: towards a political
economy of corporate involvement in free and open source
software. The Political Economy of Communication 2, 3–19.
http://www.polecom.org/index.php/polecom/article/view/35,
Boyd, D. (2010). “Social network sites as networked publics: affordances, dynamics,
and implications,” in A Networked Self: Identity, Community, and Culture on
Social Network Sites, ed. Z. Papacharissi (Oxfordshire: Routledge), 47–66. doi:
10.4324/9780203876527-8
Cagigas, D., Clifton, J., Diaz-Fuentes, D., and Fernández-Gutiérrez, M. (2021).
Blockchain for public services: a systematic literature review. IEEE Access 9,
13904–13921. doi: 10.1109/access.2021.3052019
Calcaterra, C. (2018). On-Chain Governance of Decentralized Autonomous
Organizations: Blockchain Organization Using Semada (ID 3188374). Rochester,
NY: Social Science Research Network.
Chaudhari, A. A., Laddha, D., and Potdar, M. (2019). Decentraland – a blockchain
based model for smart property experience. Int. Eng. J. Res. Dev. 4:5.
Cila, N., Ferri, G., de Waal, M., Gloerich, I., and Karpinski, T. (2020). “The
blockchain and the commons: dilemmas in the design of local platforms,”
in Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing
Systems, Honolulu, HI. doi: 10.1145/3313831.3376660
Clippinger, J., and Bollier, D. (2014). From Bitcoin to Burning Man and Beyond: The
Quest for Identity and Autonomy in a Digital Society. Amherst, MA: ID3 and Off
The Common Books.
Costanza-Chock, S. (2020). Design Justice: Community-Led Practices to Build the
Worlds We Need. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Cox, M. (2014). Understanding large social-ecological systems: introducing
the SESMAD project. Int. J. Commons 8, 265–276. doi: 10.18352/
ijc.406
De Filippi, P., and Hassan, S. (2016). “Blockchain technology as a regulatory
technology: from code is law to law is code,” in First Monday. Note That This is
Not an Argument for Code Being Law. ‘The Blockchain and the New Architecture
of Trust’, Vol. 21. ed. K. Werbach (Cambridge: MIT Press), 153–160.
De Filippi, P., and Lavayssière, X. (2020). “Blockchain technology: Toward a
decentralized governance of digital platforms?,” in The Great Awakening: New
Modes of Life Amidst Capitalist Ruins, eds A. Grear, and D. Bollier (Brooklyn,
NY: Punctum Book). doi: 10.21983/P3.0285.1.00
De Filippi, P., and Loveluck, B. (2016). The invisible politics of bitcoin: governance
crisis of a decentralized infrastructure. Internet Policy Rev. 5:32.
De Filippi, P., and Vieira, M. (2014). The commodification of information
commons: the case of cloud computing. Sci. Tech. L. Rev. 16, 102–143. doi:
10.7916/stlr.v16i1.3991
De Filippi, P., Wraty, C., and Sileno, G. (2020). Glossary of Distributed Technologies.
Available online at: https://policyreview.info/open-abstracts/smart-contracts
(accessed November 18, 2020).
Dulong de Rosnay, M., and Stalder, F. (2020). Digital commons. Internet Policy Rev.
9:15. doi: 10.14763/2020.4.1530
El Faqir, Y., Arroyo, J., and Hassan, S. (2020). “An overview of decentralized
autonomous organizations on the blockchain,”in 16th International Symposium
on Open Collaboration (OpenSym 2020), August 25– 27, 2020, Virtual
conference, Spain (New York, NY: ACM), 8
Eubanks, V. (2018). Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police,
and Punish the Poor. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Publishing Group.
Eva Coop (2021). Eva. Coop Ridesharing. Available online at: https://eva.coop/
(accessed March 4, 2021).
Ford, E. (2013). Defining and characterizing open peer review: a review of the
literature. J. Sch. Publ. 44, 311–326. doi: 10.3138/jsp.44-4-001
Forte, A., Larco, V., and Bruckman, A. (2009). Decentralization in wikipedia
governance. J. Manag. Inf. Syst. 26, 49–72. doi: 10.2753/mis0742-122226
0103
Frontiers in Blockchain | www.frontiersin.org 11 April 2021 | Volume 4 | Article 577680
fbloc-04-577680 April 29, 2021 Time: 17:1 # 12
Rozas et al. Blockchain for Global Digital Commons
Freeman, J. (2013). The tyranny of structurelessness. Womens Stud. Q. 41, 231–246.
doi: 10.1353/wsq.2013.0072
Fuchs, C. (2018). Capitalism, patriarchy, slavery, and racism in the age of
digital capitalism and digital labour. Crit. Sociol. 44, 677–702. doi: 10.1177/
0896920517691108
Fuster-Morell, M. (2010). Governance of Online Creation Communities: Provision
of Infrastructure for the Building of Digital Commons. Fiesole: Cadmus EUI.
Fuster-Morell, M. (2014). “Governance of online creation communities for
the building of digital commons: viewed through the framework of the
institutional analysis and development,” in Governing Knowledge Commons,
eds B. M. Frischmann, M. J. Madison, and K. J. Strandburg (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), 281–311. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199972036.003.
0009
Fuster-Morell, M., Salcedo, J. L., and Berlinguer, M. (2016). “Debate about the
concept of value in commons-based peer production,”in Internet Science. INSCI
2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 9934, ed. F. Bagnoli (Cham:
Springer), 27–41. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-45982-0_3
Hartswood, M., Grimpe, B., Jirotka, M., and Anderson, S. (2014). “Towards the
ethical governance of smart society,” in Social Collective Intelligence, eds D.
Miorandi, V. Maltese, M. Rovatsos, A. Nijholt, and J. Stewart (Cham: Springer),
3–30. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-08681-1_1
Hassan, S., and De Filippi, P. (2021). Decentralized autonomous organizations
(glossary of distributed technologies). Internet Policy Rev. Available online
at: https://policyreview.info/open-abstracts/decentralised-autonomous-
organisation (accessed November 17, 2020).
Hayes, A. (2016). “Decentralized banking: monetary technocracy in the digital
age,” in Banking Beyond Banks and Money: A Guide to Banking Services in the
Twenty-First Century, eds P. Tasca, T. Aste, L. Pelizzon, and N. Perony (Berlin:
Springer International Publishing), 121–131. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-424
48-4_7
Heuermann, C. (2015). Governance 2.0: a Hayekian Approach to (r)evolutionary
Self-Governance by Cryptocurrencies. Konstanz: University of Konstanz.
Hutchby, I. (2001). Technologies, texts and affordances. Sociology 35, 441–456.
doi: 10.1177/s0038038501000219
Jarrett, K. (2014). The relevance of “Women’s work”: social reproduction and
immaterial labor in digital media. Telev. New Media 15, 14–29. doi: 10.1177/
1527476413487607
Jemielniak, D. (2014). Common Knowledge?: An Ethnography of Wikipedia. Palo
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
Jemielniak, D. (2016). Wikimedia movement governance: the limits of
a-hierarchical organization. J. Organ. Chang. Manag. 29, 361–378.
doi: 10.1108/jocm-07-2013-0138
Jeong, S. (2020). Centralized Decentralization: Does Voting Matter? Simple
Economics of the DPoS Block chain Governance. Available online at: https://ssrn.
com/abstract=3575654 (April 21, 2020).
Johnston, D. A. (2014). Everything Will Be Decentralized. San Francisco, CA:
Medium.
Juris, J. S. (2012). Reflections on #occupy everywhere: social media, public space,
and emerging logics of aggregation. Am. Ethnol. 39, 259–279.
Karjalainen, R. (2020). Governance in decentralised networks. SSRN Electron. J.
35. Available online at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3551099 (accessed November 18, 2020).
Metzger, J. (2019). The current landscape of blockchain-based, crowdsourced
arbitration. Macquarie L. J. 19, 81–102.
Min, T., Wang, H., Guo, Y., and Cai, W. (2019). “Blockchain games: a survey,” in
Proceedings of the 2019 IEEE Conference on Games (CoG) (London: IEEE).
Mindel, V., Tech, V., Mathiassen, L., and Rai, A. (2018). The sustainability of
polycentric information commons. MIS Q. 42, 607–631. doi: 10.25300/misq/
2018/14015
Morozov, E. (2013). To Save Everything, Click Here: Technology, Solutionism, and
the Urge to Fix Problems that Don’t Exist. London: Penguin.
Nakamoto, S. (2008). Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System. New York,
NY: CoinDesk.
Nayak, P. K., and Berkes, F. (2012). Linking global drivers with local and regional
change: a social-ecological system approach in Chilika Lagoon, Bay of Bengal.
Reg. Environ. Change 14, 2067–2078. doi: 10.1007/s10113-012-0369-3
O’Neil, C. (2016). Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality
and Threatens Democracy. Portland, OR: Broadway Books.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for
Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Field, C. B., Norgaard, R. B., and Policansky, D. (1999).
Revisiting the commons: local lessons, global challenges. Science 284, 278–282.
doi: 10.1126/science.284.5412.278
Ostrom, V., Tiebout, C. M., and Warren, R. (1961). The organization of
government in metropolitan areas: a theoretical inquiry. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 55,
831–842. doi: 10.2307/1952530
Pitt, J., Diaconescu, A., and Bollier, D. (2017). Technology for Collective Action.
New York, NY: IEEE Technology and Society.
Pitt, J., Schaumeier, J., and Artikis, A. (2012). Axiomatization of socio-
economic principles for self-organizing institutions: concepts, experiments and
challenges. ACM Trans. Auton. Adapt. Syst. 7, 1–39. doi: 10.1145/2382570.
2382575
Postman, N. (1993). Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology.
New York, NY: Vintage Books.
Potts, J. (2019). Innovation Commons: The Origin of Economic Growth. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Qayum, A., and Razzaq, A. (2020). “A self-evolving design of blockchain-
based open source community – IEEE conference publication,” in 2020
3rd International Conference on Computing, Mathematics and Engineering
Technologies (iCoMET) (Sukkur: IEEE), 1–11.
Risius, M., and Spohrer, K. (2017). A blockchain research framework. Bus. Inf. Syst.
Eng. 59, 385–409. doi: 10.1007/s12599-017-0506-0
Rozas, D. (2017). Self-Organisation in Commons-Based Peer Production. Drupal :
“The Drop is Always Moving”. Surrey: University of Surrey.
Rozas, D. (2020). “Affordances of decentralised technologies for commons-based
governance of shared technical infrastructure,” in Prospectives, 1, 1, Bartlett
School of Architecture (London: University College of London). Available
online at: https://journal.b-pro.org/article/affordances-of-decentralised-
technologies-for-commons-based-governance/
Rozas, D., Gilbert, N., Hodkinson, P., and Hassan, S. (2021a). Talk is silver, code is
gold? Beyond traditional notions of contribution in peer production: the case of
Drupal. Front. Hum. Dyn. 3:618207. doi: 10.3389/fhumd.2021.618207
Rozas, D., and Huckle, S. (2021). Loosen control without losing control:
Formalization and decentralization within commons-based peer production.
J. Assoc. Inf. Sci. Technol. 72, 204–223. doi: 10.1002/asi.24393
Rozas, D., Tenorio-Fornés, A., Díaz-Molina, S., and Hassan, S. (2021b). When
Ostrom Meets Blockchain: Exploring the Potentials of Blockchain for Commons
Governance. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Open. doi: 10.1177/21582440211002526
Safner, R. (2016). Institutional entrepreneurship, wikipedia, and the opportunity
of the commons. J. Institutional Econ. 12, 743–771. doi: 10.1017/s174413
7416000096
Sandoval, M. (2019). Entrepreneurial activism? Platform cooperativism between
subversion and co-optation. Crit. Sociol. 46, 801–817.
Schneider, N. (2019). Decentralization: an incomplete ambition. J. Cult. Econ. 12,
265–285. doi: 10.1080/17530350.2019.1589553
Shackelford, S., and Myers, S. (2017). Block-by-block: leveraging the power of
blockchain technology to build trust and promote cyber peace. SSRN Electron.
J. 19:334. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2874090
Sharon, T., and Zandbergen, D. (2017). From data fetishism to quantifying selves:
self-tracking practices and the other values of data. New Media Soc. 19, 1695–
1709. doi: 10.1177/1461444816636090
Shaw, A., and Hill, B. M. (2014). Laboratories of oligarchy? How the
iron law extends to peer production. J. Commun. 64, 215–238. doi: 10.1111/
jcom.12082
Stern, P. (2011). Design principles for global commons: natural
resources and emerging technologies. Int. J. Commons 5, 213–232.
doi: 10.18352/ijc.305
Stevenson, K. (2010). Delete: the virtue of forgetting in the digital age. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press. doi: 10.1108/rmj.2010.28120aae.001
Sullivan, L. E. (2009). The SAGE Glossary of the Social and Behavioral Sciences.
Newcastle upon Tyne: SAGE.
Swan, M. (2015). Blockchain: Blueprint for a New Economy. Newton, MA: O’Reilly.
Tenorio-Fornés, A., Jacynycz, V., Llop-Vila, D., Sánchez-Ruiz, A., and Hassan,
S. (2019). “Towards a decentralized process for scientific publication and
peer review using blockchain and IPFS,” in Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii
International Conference on System Sciences, Maui, HI.
Frontiers in Blockchain | www.frontiersin.org 12 April 2021 | Volume 4 | Article 577680
fbloc-04-577680 April 29, 2021 Time: 17:1 # 13
Rozas et al. Blockchain for Global Digital Commons
Thierer, A. (2016). Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for
Comprehensive Technological Freedom. Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center
at George Mason University.
Tkacz, N. (2014). Wikipedia and the Politics of Openness. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press. doi: 10.7208/chicago/9780226192444.001.0001
Viégas, F. B., Wattenberg, M., and McKeon, M. M. (2007). “The hidden order
of wikipedia,” in Online Communities and Social Computing. OCSC 2007.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 4564, ed. D. Schuler (Berlin: Springer),
445–454.
Voshmgir, S. (2019). Token Economy: How Blockchains and Smart Contracts
Revolutionize the Economy. Berlin: BlockchainHub.
Weber, S. (2004). The Success of Open Source, Vol. 368. Cambridge: Cambridge
Univ Press.
Wellman, B., Quan-Haase, A., Boase, J., Chen, W., Hampton, K., Díaz, I., et al.
(2003). The social affordances of the internet for networked individualism.
J. Comput. Mediat. Commun. 8:JCMC834. doi: 10.1111/j.1083-6101.2003.tb
00216.x
Zetzsche, D. A., Buckley, R. P., and Arner, D. W. (2018). The distributed liability
of distributed ledgers: legal risks of blockchain. SSRN Electron. J. 14 , 1–43.
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3018214
Conflict of Interest: AT-F was employed by the company Decentralized Academy
Ltd.
The remaining authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of
any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2021 Rozas, Tenorio-Fornés and Hassan. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No
use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Blockchain | www.frontiersin.org 13 April 2021 | Volume 4 | Article 577680
